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OBSERVATIONS ON THE PROPOSED ALTERATION OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDATORY PROCEDURE*
Albert E. Jenner*
The enactment of the amendments now under consideration would, I
feel, lead to an outright revolution in this country, a revolution not in the
gradual sense, but a fighting one conducted by the nation's great majorities
who would be, in that eventuality, under the complete domination and subjection of minorities of both states and people.
The first of these proposals, the - subject of the present inquiry, would
alter the amendatory process prescribed by Article V of the Constitution. It
is designed to vest the amendatory power in the state legislatures to the exclusion of the Congress.
The sponsors of these amendments seem to have erred, strategically at
least, in going beyond their first proposition for it is the remaining two amendments, that calling for the overruling of Baker v. Carr and the last to create
a "Court of the Union" to review the rulings of the United States Supreme
Court, which betrayed their underlying purpose and intent, thus giving warning of the extremes to which the minority group of states and the minorities
within these states might go.
The adoption of the first of these amendments would effect a complete
redistribution of governmental power, channelling to the states much of which
now rests with the federal Congress. The ultimate result would be a confederation or league of states similar to that under the Articles of Confederation
of 1777. No longer would we maintain in the central government the power
and jurisdiction so essential to the preservation of the Union. While the
states would be afforded sufficient sovereignty to devote their attentions to
purely local problems, their participation in the national picture would be
barely adequate to make known the parochial views of the fifty separate
jurisdictions. It should be noted in this connection that this process would not
be a mere transference of power to the states as states, but to the state legislatures. The importance of this distinction is obvious upon the slightest consideration of the present maldistribution of representation in the legislative bodies.
The inequalities presented by these apportionments would thus be preserved,
and, by the increase of power, worsened. A representative form of government would vanish.
Apparently, then, the lessons of the errors and impracticality of the
Articles of Confederation have been lost to the amendments' sponsors. The
blood bath of the Civil War, fought in great part to accentuate the indissolubility of the Union, will have been for naught.
Political, as well as legal, repercussions would ensue. There would be
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precluded any possibility of a national forum for the debate of national and
international issues. Limited debating societies would obtain in each of the
fifty states. With Nebraska as the only state with a unicameral legislature,
we would be left with ninety-nine such societies.
How, then, did such proposals ever come about? While there is general agreement that the danger of their passage is slight, the meandered
method of their genesis is highly pertinent to a fair evaluation. The sponsorship rests with the general assembly of the Council of State Governments,
a normally conservative group and one of our most highly respected organizations and institutions. It consists almost exclusively of legislators of considerable prominence and ability from each of the several states selected from
commissions on interstate cooperation existing in each of the states. The
National Legislative Council, an affiliate of the Council of State Governments,
was the initial proponent and drafter of the amendment. While this National
Legislative Council meets annually, the general assembly convenes only half
as often. This fact, as we shall see, becomes quite significant. In September
of 1962, with a meeting of the general assembly but three months distant,
the National Legislative Council met, fully realizing that whatever proposals
were not submitted in December to the general assembly would not be acted
upon for at least two additional years. It issued a report critical, in a fairly
statesmanlike but direct fashion, of the action of the Congress and the executive department of the federal government over the preceding decade, which
action, it alleged, had served to erode the powers and functions of the states,
an erosion which had progressed to that point where the Union itself might be
adversely affected. While it is true that the Union depends upon alert, dynamic
and powerful states for its most effective functioning, the Council, rather than
discuss the central requisites of that delicate balance between Union and
state, chose to devise a "meat-cleaver" method of rectification. Rather than
restore the scale's balance, if such seemed necessary, the Council's amendments
so weighted the opposite pan as to plummet the scale to the ground.
This report was circulated among the delegates and a committee drawn
up to draft the present amendments. The actual draft of these amendments
was not submitted to the delegates of the general assembly until the opening
day of its convention. In the course of but one day, the day following the
opening, the delegates read, debated, and acted favorably upon all three of
these amendments. Hence, as a special order of business, on the sixth of
December, 1962, it was proposed completely to revamp the government of
the United States. The complete unpreparedness of these delegates to pass
upon motions of such moment is perhaps best evidenced by the fact that the
second amendment received fewer favorable votes than the first, and the third
still fewer. This suggests that the delegates became relatively more informed as
the afternoon wore on.
Under Article V of the Constitution, amendments may be initiated either
by the Congress or by the legislatures of the several states; the latter method
has never been used. Under the former, the Congress, on a two-thirds vote
of both Houses, submits the proposal to the state legislatures or to state con-
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ventions. The proposal becomes a constitutional amendment when and if it
is ratified by three-fourths of such legislatures or conventions, depending upon
which avenue Congress has chosen. At present, then, the consent of thirtyeight such legislatures or conventions conditions the adoption.
The alternative method requires the Congress, upon the application of twothirds of the state legislatures, to "call a convention for proposing amendments." Nothing further is said concerning what this convention is to do.
The proposals which emanate from that convention take effect in the same
manner provided for the alternative passage, namely, ratification by threefourths of the state legislatures or state conventions.
The general assembly's proposal seeks to eliminate completely the national convention method of amendment. It further proposes to abolish the
state convention alternative method of amendment regardless of whether the
original proposal was initiated by Congress or by a national convention. It is
intended, then, that the state legislatures control the amendatory process.
Also, if three-fourths of the state legislatures submit identical proposals by
way of application, then the Congress is required, by purely ministerial procedures, to certify these proposed amendments to the very same state legislatures. This empty course of action serves to circumvent completely the Congress, relegating the entire amendatory procedure to the mercy of the state
legislatures. The potential effects of this procedure to the. Constitution need
not be listed. The combined effects of this and the other two amendments
would possibly include the destruction of the Supreme Court of the United
States, the elimination of Congress, and the sharp modification of at least
the first eight amendments to the Constitution, at least as applied to the states
via the Fourteenth Amendment.
As an incidental point, it is interesting to note that Section Two of these
resolutions recites that the article shall be inoperative unless ratified, within
seven years of the date of its submission, by the legislatures of three-fourths
of the several states. This is apparently an adroit attempt to prevent the
Congress from employing the state convention alternative method, ,which it
is empowered to do under the Constitution. Yet it is only through this alternative method that any semblance of representation of all the people can be
obtained.
Finally, the amendment under consideration is perhaps the most extraordinary and astounding governmental proposal of recent times. If there is at
present an imbalance in the federal-state area of action (and such an imbalance is by no means conceded), correction of the defect lies in the
strengthening of the states under our present system and not in the virtual
demolishing of the Congress by its reduction to a pleasant debating society.

